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II.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the

trial

court

and

concluding,

as

a matter

of

law,

that

Petitioners' claim is time-barred because they could and should
have reasonably discovered, before 1987, that the Respondent had
failed to protect their security interest;
2.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in failing

and refusing to apply the discovery rule to toll the four year
statute of limitations where Petitioners did not know and should
not reasonably have known of Respondent's professional negligence
and misconduct and suffered no damages until a time which was less
than four years before they filed suit;
3. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous and/or in
failing to remand this case to the trial court for a determination
of

when

Petitioners

should

have

discovered

Respondents'

professional negligence and misconduct;
4. Whether the issues presented are sufficient to invoke
this Court's judicial discretion and justify review by writ of
certiorari under Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

III.

REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The Utah Court of Appeals filed its decision below

on July 29, 1993. The decision is published at 218 Utah Adv. Rep.
34 (1993).

The opinion has not yet been published in the Pacific

Reporter.
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
A.

The Sixth Judicial District Court of Garfield County

entered judgment on October 18, 1991, and supplemental judgment on
November

27, 1991.

The trial court's Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law are dated September 26, 1991. The Utah Court of
Appeals filed its opinion on July 29f 1993.
B.

There has been no Order respecting a rehearing. An

Order granting an extension of time to file this Petition was
entered on August 27, 1993. The Order requires that this Petition
be filed by September 27, 1993.
C.

Inasmuch as this is the original Petition for Writ

of Certiorari, no Cross-Petition has been filed.
D.

The statutory provision which confers jurisdiction

on the Utah Supreme Court is: U.C.A. Section 78-2-2(3)(a)f 1953, as
amended.

V.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES

The statutes controlling the issues raised

in this

Petition are:
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) . . Statute of Limitations;
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The pertinent provisions of these statutes are attached in Appendix
A.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for review by writ of certiorari of a

decision of the Utah Court of Appeals reversing a judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court of Garfield County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, in favor of Petitioners and against
Respondent. Petitioners brought this action against Respondent for
damages sustained and attorney

fees incurred as a result of

negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a real
estate transaction in Garfield County, Utah.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
1. This action was filed on December 27, 1989.

Harold

Sevy and Winona Sevy (hereinafter "Sevy") claim that Security Title
Company

of Southern

Utah

(hereinafter

"Security

Title") was

negligent and breached its fiduciary duty to them when it failed to
properly advise them and perfect their security interest in 39
shares of water stock which they were selling to Kyle and Cindy
Stewart
Utah.

(hereinafter "Stewart") in Panguitch, Garfield County,
(Comp., R. 1-7)
2. Sevy seeks damages for the cost of defending title to

said water stock, repurchasing it after his lien was found to be
inferior to that of a lending institution, and attorney fees and
costs. (Id.)
(

3

3.

Security Title denies the allegations of Sevy's

complaint and affirmatively alleges that Sevy's claims are barred
by the four year statute of limitations. (Answer, R. 19-25)
4. On September 26, 1991 , after a bench trial on July 8,
1991, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

It concluded that Sevy was entitled to judgment against

Security Title for the amounts prayed, as aforesaid, and for
attorney fees and cost. (Appendix "B")
5. On October 18, 1991, Judgment was entered in favor of
Sevy and against Security Title in the amount of $26,411.76, with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. (Appendix "C")
6.

On November 27, 1991f Supplemental Judgment was

entered in the amount of $4,935.40 for post trial attorney fees and
costs incurred, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until
paid. (Appendix "D")
7. On July 29, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, concluding that Sevy's claim was time-barred
because he had not met the threshold requirement to toll the
statute

of

limitations

under

the

"exceptional

circumstances"

discovery rule and that he could and should have reasonably
discovered that Security Title had failed to protect his security
interest more than four years before he filed this action.

The

Utah Court of Appeals vacated the award of damages and attorney
fees to Sevy and awarded costs to Security Title. (Appendix "E")
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR

REVIEW
4

1.

On April 28, 1991, Sevy sold to Stewart irrigated

farm land in Garfield County, Utah, with 39 shares of water stock
in the Long Canal Company, which furnished irrigation water to the
land.

The purchase price was $25,000.00, with a down payment of

$5,000.00 and annual installments on the unpaid balance. (Appendix
"B", p. 2; Appendix "E", p. 1)
2.

Sevy and Stewart requested that Security Title

prepare documents to protect their respective interests in the
transaction.

They asked Security Title to transfer title to the

land and water stock to Stewart and to provide for a lien in favor
of Sevy against the land and water stock to secure payment of the
balance of the purchase price. (Appendix "B", pp. 2, 3; Appendix
"E", pp. 1, 2)
3.

Security Title prepared:

Sevy to Stewart;

(a)

a warranty deed from

(b) a note from Stewart to Sevy;

(c) a deed of

trust with assignment of rents against the land and water stock
from Stewart to Sevy; and (d) an owners title insurance policy for
Stewart for $25,000.00. (Appendix "B", pp. 3, 5; Appendix "E", p.
2)
4.

At the closing on April 28, 1991, Security Title

requested that Sevy deliver to it his water stock certificate
representing 112 shares of the Long Canal Company.

Sevy endorsed

the certificate and appointed Security Title as agent to transfer
39 of the 112 shares to Stewart.
"E", p. 2)
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(Appendix "B", p. 3;

Appendix

5. After closing, Security Title recorded the warranty
deed and trust deed and caused to be transferred to Stewart 39
shares of the Long Canal Company which issued a new certificate
numbered

206

representing

39

shares

to

Stewart

and

a

new

certificate representing 73 shares to Sevy. (Appendix MB"f pp. 3,
4;

Appendix "E", p. 2)
6. Security Title delivered the warranty deed to Stewart

and the trust deed note, deed of trust and 73 shares of the Long
Canal Company to Sevy.

Security Title failed to obtain a receipt

from the party to whom it delivered certificate numbered 206
representing the 39 shares sold by Sevy to Stewart. Although there
was a conflict in the evidence at trial, the trial court found,
based on the circumstances, that Security Title delivered said
certificate to Stewart. (Appendix "B", pp. 4, 5; Appendix "E", p.
2)
7.

Harold Sevy is a farmer, does not have a formal

education, and relied on Security Title to prepare proper documents
and secure his first lien against the real property and water
stock.

He had, prior to this transaction, been an officer of The

Long Canal Company, but had no knowledge regarding how to transfer
shares and how to perfect security interests therein. Winona Sevy
did nothing more in this transaction than sign documents as
requested by her husband, Harold Sevy. (Appendix "B", p. 7)
8. Security Title decided what documents to prepare and
the form the transaction would take, prepared the documents, caused
the warranty deed and deed of trust to be recorded and the water
6

stock to be transferred, did the title work, served as escrow agent
and as Trustee under the deed of trust, and issued an owners title
insurance policy to Stewart. (Appendix "B", p. 5)
9. At the time of the transaction, both Sevy and Stewart
believed that Sevy was transferring to Stewart the land and water
stock.

Sevy believed that he received a valid first lien against

the land and water stock transferred to Stewart to secure payment
of the balance of the purchase price. (Appendix "B", p. 4)
10.

Sevy paid to Security Title the sum of $75.00 for

its services and the sum of $135.00 as a title insurance premium.
(Appendix "B", p. 5; Appendix "E", p. 2)
11.

The only step taken by Security Title to provide a

security interest in Sevy to the water stock was the preparation
and recording of the deed of trust against the land and the water
stock. (Appendix "B", p. 8)
12. On August 21, 1985, Stewart borrowed money from the
Lockhart

Company,

collateral.

pledging

the

39 shares of water

stock as

The Lockhart Company perfected its security interest

by taking possession of the 39 share certificate and through filing
a financing statement with the State of Utah on September 3, 1985.
On March 31, 1986, Stewart borrowed additional sums from The
Lockhart Company.
assigned

its

rights

On October 2, 1986, the Lockhart
against

Stewart

to Associates

Company

Financial

Services of Utah, Inc., (hereinafter "Associates"). (Appendix "B",
pp. 7, 8;

Appendix "E", p. 3)
<
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13.

In 1986, Stewart defaulted on his payments to Sevy

and Sevy repossessed the farm land.

Thereafter Stewart filed a

petition in bankruptcy. (Appendix "B", p. 8;
14.

Appendix "E", p. 3)

On April 15, 1987, Associates filed suit in the

Fifth District Court of Iron County against Sevy and Security Title
to establish the priority of its security interest in the water
stock.

Sevy defended said action on the merits.

Security Title

neither made an appearance nor otherwise defended. (Appendix "B",
pp. 8, 9;

Appendix "E", p. 3)
15.

On November 2, 1987f said court entered summary

judgment declaring that Associates had a valid first lien and
perfected security interest in and to said water stock, free of any
claim on the part of Sevy and Security Title. (Appendix "B", pp. 9,
10;

Appendix "E", p. 3;
16.

affirmed

the

On June 21f
summary

(Appendix "B", p. 10;
17.

Summary Judgment, Appendix "F")
1989f the Utah Court of Appeals,

judgment

of

the

Fifth

District

Court.

opinion of Court of Appeals, Appendix "G")

On August 31, 1989, Sevy purchased the water stock

from Associates for the sum of $7,250.00 in order to preserve the
entire security described in the deed of trust. (Appendix "B", p.
11;

Appendix "E", p. 3)
18.

Sevy filed the lawsuit from which this petition

arises on December 27, 1989, alleging that Security Title was
professionally negligent and breached its fiduciary duty to Sevy in
failing to perfect his security interest in the water stock.
Security Title moved for summary judgment on the ground that Sevy's
8

claim was barred by the four year statute of limitations.
trial court denied the motion. (Appendix "E", p. 3;

The

Complaint, R.

1-7)
19.

On September 26, 1991, after a bench trial on July

8, 1991, at which both lay and expert witnesses were called and
testified, the trial court found:
(a)

The general public relies on title insurance

companies to properly prepare documents and conduct real estate
transactions

and

closings

and

further

relies

on

what

title

companies say with respect to real estate transactions; (Appendix
"B", p. 5)
(b) The custom and practice in the title insurance
industry, in 1981 and at the time of trial, where the sale involves
water stock in an irrigation company with a security interest in
favor of the seller, was that the title company do one of the
following:

delay transferring

the stock on the books of the

corporation until the final payment on the purchase price is made
to seller;

make the transfer on the books of the corporation and

hold the new certificate in escrow until the final payment is made;
transfer the stock on the books of the corporation and deliver the
new certificate to the seller with instructions that seller retain
possession of the certificate until final payment is made;
advise seller to seek legal counsel.
company

to

take

at

least

one

of

the

or

A failure of the title
foregoing

steps

would

constitute a breach of its duty to the seller; (Appendix "B", p. 6)
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(c) Sevy relied on Security Title to protect him by
providing a valid first lien in his favor against the real property
and water stock being sold and transferred to Stewart; (Id.)
(d)

Security Title breached its duty to Sevy by

failing to take any one of the steps described in sub-paragraph (b)
of this paragraph 19.
(e)

(Appendix "B"f pp. 6, 7)

The first knowledge Sevy had that Stewart had

given a lien against the water stock was when Sevy was sued by
Associates in 1987.

(Appendix "B", p. 9;

Tr., pp. 45, 46)

(f) Sevy was justified, under the deed of trust, in
taking action he thought necessary to defend the action filed by
Associates and in prosecuting said appeal in order to preserve the
security;

(Appendix "B", p. 10)
(g)

The attorney fees and costs, in the amount of

$10,250.00, incurred by Sevy in defending the action of Associates
and

in prosecuting

the appeal

from the judgment

of the Fifth

District Court, were reasonable and were necessarily incurred in
Sevy's attempts to preserve the security under the deed of trust.
(Appendix "B", p. 12)
(h)

The amount expended by Sevy in purchasing the

water stock from Associates

($7,250.00) was reasonable and was

necessarily incurred in preserving the security under the deed of
trust. (Id.)
(i) Security Title's defense of this action, under
all the circumstances, was without merit and was not asserted in
good faith; (Id.)
10

(j) Security Title's representation to Sevy, which
is implicit in what was said and done by the parties hereto and by
Stewart, that it was qualified to prepare the documents and
orchestrate the transaction, was deceptive under the Utah Consumer
Protection Act which applies to this case; (Id,)
(k) A reasonable attorney fee to be awarded to Sevy
in prosecuting this action is $5,000.00, plus reasonable fees
incurred subsequent to the time of trial.

(Appendix "B", pp. 12,

13)
20.

The trial court made this oral finding:

I find against the Defendant on the Statute
of Limitation . . . . The Court makes a
finding that the Statute of Limitations would
commence as of the time of the discovery,
which was the filing of the [Associates
Financial] lawsuit.
(Appendix "E", p. 8;

Tr., p. 249)

21. Security Title never told Sevy that the water stock
should not be transferred until he was paid in full, that Stewart
should not have possession of the new water certificate until he
paid Sevy in full,
possession,

that Sevy should hold the water stock in his

or that

he should seek legal counsel.

Moreover,

Security Title told Sevy that he should have the trust deed and the
trust deed note in order to protect him and that "they'd take care
of the whole works."
22.

(Tr., pp. 44, 45)

On October 18, 1991, Judgment was entered in favor

of Sevy and against Security Title in the amount of $26,411.76,
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from entry of judgment
until paid. (Appendix "C")
11

23.

On November 27, 1991, Supplemental Judgment in the

amount of $4,935.40 was entered for post trial attorney fees and
for Sevy's costs, plus interest. (Appendix "D")
24. On July 29f 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, concluding:
requirement

to

toll

the

that Sevy had not met the threshold
statute

of

limitations

"exceptional circumstances" discovery rule;

under

the

that Sevy could and

should have reasonably discovered that Security Title had failed to
protect his security interest before 1987; and that Sevy's action
was time-barred.

The Utah Court of Appeals further vacated the

award of damages and attorney fees to Sevy and awarded costs to
Security Title. (Appendix "E")
ARGUMENT
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW NOS. 1 AND 2. WHETHER THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND CONCLUDING,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS TIME-BARRD BECAUSE
THEY COULD AND SHOULD HAVE REASONABLY DISCOVERED, BEFORE 1987, THAT
THE RESPONDENT HAD FAILED TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY INTEREST; AND
WHEHTER THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
APPLY THE DISCOVERY RULE TO TOLL THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS WHERE PETITIONERS DID NOT KNOW AND SHOULD NOT
REASONABLY HAVE KNOWN OF RESPONDENT'S PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND
MISCONDUCT AND SUFFERED NO DAMAGES UNTIL A TIME WHICH WAS LESS THAN
FOUR YEARS BEFORE THEY FILED SUIT.
Point No. 1. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals is
Inconsistent with Prior Decisions of Both the Utah Supreme Court
and Another Panel of the Court of Appeals.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
issued decisions which cannot be reconciled with the Appeals Court
ruling in this action. Inasmuch as the ruling below is in conflict
with other rulings of this Court and the Court of Appeals, a Writ
of Certiorari should be granted.
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In Klinaer v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) this
Court held that sellers of real property could not reasonably have
discovered a surveyor's negligence until the surveyor's error was
brought to sellers' attention nearly fourteen (14) years after the
survey was conducted. Despite the prejudice to the surveyor in the
adoption of the discovery rule (the Court acknowledged that the
surveyor had no survey records or notes, and that presumably the
memories of the survey party had dimmed after 14 years), this Court
found that the sellers "had no reason to suspect that the survey
was inaccurate, nor did they refrain from doing anything that might
reasonably have been expected of them that could have disclosed the
error."

791 P.2d at 872.

Under these facts the Court held that

"the evidence [was] not so stale or remote as to outweigh the
prejudice to defendants of having their claim barred by the statute
of limitation. The discovery rule should be applied to the statute
of limitation for surveyor negligence under Utah Code Ann. Section
78-12-25(2) ." Id^.
In Merklev v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16 (Utah App. 1989) the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney had negligently
failed to advise the plaintiffs that a UCC-1 security interest in
personal property must be renewed every five years in order to
retain its efficacy.

The plaintiffs alleged that they had lost

their priority security interest in personal property when their
buyers filed a petition in bankruptcy seven years after the initial
UCC-1 filing.

In Merklev, the critical issue was the date the

alleged malpractice action accrued. In holding that the discovery
13

rule applies to a legal malpractice case, the Merkley panel of the
Court of Appeals noted that "the attorney-client relationship is
based

upon

trust,

and

is

a

situation

in

which

one

less

knowledgeable must rely on another, who has special expertise, for
advice and assistance."

778 P.2d at 19.

The court also noted

that the nature of the relationship "is such that, often, attorney
negligence would not be discovered until years after the act had
occurred . . . "

Id. See also Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1314

(Utah 1990) (Applying the discovery rule to defamation cases, and
acknowledging that "[u]nlike cases involving direct injury to the
person, a libel may remain undiscovered for years, all the while
having its effect on one's reputation.").
The rationale advanced by this Court in Klinqer and the
Court of Appeals in Merkley have direct application to the claims
asserted by Sevy against the Respondent, and neither case can
reasonably be distinguished from the facts presented to the Appeals
Court below.

In each case the injured party placed its trust and

reliance in another with special knowledge, skills and abilities
not possessed by the injured party. In each case the misconduct or
negligence was not discovered until a considerable period of time
after the misconduct occurred. In each case the very nature of the
transaction was such that the misconduct was not discovered until
years after the misconduct occurred.

In each case the damage to

the parties did not accrue until some other event occurred, e.g.,
the sale of the property (Klinqer), the bankruptcy filing of a
purchaser

(Merkley), or the hypothecation of the water stock
14

certificate (Sevy). In Klinger as in this actionf important facts,
information and documents were lost or unavailable if for no other
reason than the passage of time.

Finally, the problems of proof

are no more onerous for one party than the other.

See Myers v.

McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981).
Sevy submits that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in
direct conflict with the decision of this Court in Klinqer and that
of the Appeals Court in Merkley. As a result, the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that Sevy could and should have discovered
Respondent's misconduct, and further erred in its refusal to apply
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this
action. As a result, the burden of discovery placed on Sevy by the
Utah Court of Appeals is in conflict with a prior decision of this
court, and requires a review of this decision, by this Court.
Point No. 2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is a
Departure from the Ordinary and Usual Course of Judicial
Proceedings.
A.

The Appeals Court Failed to Distinguish the Facts
of This Case From Those Presented in Klinqer and
Merkley.

The Utah Court of Appeals made no attempt to distinguish
either Klinger or Merkley from the issues presented below.
submits

that

the

Appeals

Court's

failure

to

address

Sevy
these

distinctions constitutes a departure from the usual course of
judicial proceedings, and requires a review and reversal by this
Court.

In cases where Utah's appellate courts have held that the

discovery rule should not apply, the injured parties uniformly had
knowledge of the other's misconduct.
15

In Warren v. Provo City

Corp., 838 P.2d

1125

(Utah 1992), this Court found that the

airplane crash (the cause of plaintiff's injuries) gave plaintiff
reasonable grounds to question whether the defendant was enforcing
its ordinance on airplane safety and insurance.

In addition, the

evidence indicated that prior to the expiration of the bar date,
plaintiff's counsel had made a series of unanswered inquiries
relating to defendant's compliance with its ordinance.

In Atwood

v. Sturm, Ruger and Co., Inc., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) the
Plaintiff was aware of his injuries, damages and a possible cause
of action several months before the four year limitations period
passed.

In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139

(Utah 1991), the Plaintiff was aware of and had vivid memories of
the abuse giving rise to his claim. In Briqham Young University v.
Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987), the plaintiff
knew of its cause of action against the defendant three and a half
years before the limitation period expired. Finally, in Jackson v.
Lavton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987) the plaintiffs filed a
timely notice of claim against the city under the governmental
immunity act, the alleged defect complained of was patent, and
plaintiff was aware of the injury four years and six months before
filing her complaint.
As indicated in the trial court's finding of fact no. 25,
Sevy's first knowledge of Respondent's misconduct was on the day he
was sued by Associated. The facts relating to Sevy's claim against
the Respondent are grossly different from any of the cases where
this Court has found that the discovery rule should not apply.
16

Sevy was unaware of Respondent's misconduct and negligence until
well after the four year limitation period had passed.

Under the

holdings of this Court and, with the exception of the ruling below,
the holdings of the Utah Court of Appeals, the discovery rule
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations until the date
that Sevy became aware of Respondent's misconduct.
B.

The Appeals Court Ignored the Klinqer Rationale of
Why the Discovery Rule Should be Extended to Land
Transaction Cases.

In its opinion below the Utah Court of Appeals goes to
great

efforts

discovered

to conclude

that

that the Respondent

security interest.

Sevy
had

could

and

should

failed to protect

have

Sevy's

218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37. The considerable

burden cast on Sevy by the Appeals Court was clearly considered and
rejected by this Court in Klinqer. 791 P.2d at 871. The arguments
and rationale articulated in Klinqer in favor of applying the
discovery rule apply equally to this action: an innocent user of
title company services should not carry the burden of the title
company's mistakes; recovery by a reliant user of title company
services will promote cautionary practices among title companies;
the passage of time does not entail a danger that false and
speculative claims will be asserted, nor does it appear that the
parties' testimonial proof will be made more difficult; it is
illogical to require the user of title company services to hire two
or three others to assure that the action taken by the first was
accurate; strict application of the statute of limitation would be
unjust; and the user of title company lacks the means or ability to
17

ascertain that a wrong has been committed.

Id.

There is no

sound, just or equitable reason why the policy considerations
adopted by this Court in Klinger should not apply to this case, and
the failure of the Appeals Court to address these rationale and
apply them to the facts of this case is a departure from the usual
and accepted course of judicial proceedings which merits a review
by this Court.
QUESTION FOR REVIEW NO. 3. WHETHER THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND/OR IN FAILING TO REMAND THIS CASE TO THE
TRIAL COURT FOR A DETERMINATION OF WHEN PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE
DISCOVERED RESPONDENT'S PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND MISCONDUCT.
The Appeals Court's assessment of when Sevy could have
and should have known of Respondent's misconduct is predicated on
the rule that "[wjhether the discovery rule applies to toll the
statute of limitations is a question of law, thus we show no
deference to the trial court's ruling on appeal, but review it for
correctness.'" Sevy v. Security Title Co., 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34,
35 (Utah App. 1993); citing Klinger v. Rightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 870
(Utah 1990).

Sevy submits that the Court of Appeals erred in its

assessment of the factual basis for its ruling.

Specifically, by

ruling that any finding of the trial court that Sevy could not have
known of Respondent's misconduct until Sevy was sued in 1987, the
Court of Appeals improperly usurped the function of the trial court
as the finder of fact. This departure from the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings also merits a review by this Court.
The issue of when a plaintiff knew or should have known
of his claim against a defendant is a question of fact to be
18

determined by the trier of fact.

Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d

435, 437 (Utah 1968); Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1314 (Utah
App. 1990).

In complete disregard of this rule, the Appeals Court

substituted its opinion for that of the trial court, and completely
disregarded the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence
and the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony.
Sevy submits that there is ample support in the Court's
findings for a ruling that the earliest date Sevy knew or could or
should have known of the Respondent's negligence was in April 1987
when it was sued by Associates. In finding no. 25, the trial court
found that "[t]he first knowledge that Sevy had that Stewart had
given a lien against said certificate was when Sevy was sued by
Associates, as aforesaid" in April 1987.

In other findings the

trial court found that Sevy believed he had a good and valid lien
against the water stock (Finding no. 10); that the public relies on
title

companies

to

properly

prepare

documents,

conduct

transactions, and that the public relies on what it is told by
title

companies

(Finding

no.

17); that

Sevy

had

no

formal

education, had no knowledge of how to perfect a security interest
in water stock and in fact relied on Respondent to protect him and
secure his first lien on the water stock (Findings no. 19 and 22).
These

findings

support, both directly

and by

inference, the

proposition that Sevy neither knew nor should have known of
Respondent's negligence and misconduct prior to April 1987.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial
court's findings are not "crystal clear," 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36,
19

under the rule described above, the Court of Appeals should have
remanded the issue to the trial court for further consideration.
See, e.g., Klinger, Allen, Myers, and Christiansen, supra.
CONCLUSION
As described in detail above, the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals should be reviewed by this Court.

The ruling

below conflicts with prior decisions of both the Utah Supreme Court
and decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals on the application of
the discovery rule.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals is a

radical departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings not only in its disregard of the law on the discovery
rule, but also in its usurpation of the fact finding function of
the trial court.

Finally, each of the questions raised above

present important questions of law that should be decided by the
Utah Supreme Court.

For these special and important reasons, the

Petitioners request that the Court grant their Petition for Writ of
Certiorari and review the ruling below of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
Respectfully submitted this ^?7>&day of September, 1993.
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON AND GOTTFREDSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellees

Mark Fitzgerald Bell, Esq.
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APPENDIX A
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Annotated S e c t i o n 7 8 - 1 2 - 1 p r o v i d e s :

78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25 provides:
78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Title 25, Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

APPENDIX B
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GAHHjfeLD COUNT r
NO. ,-JTV)
FlLEC

SEP 3 0 1991
>

Clerk

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD SEVY and WINONA
SEVY,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 3375

vs.
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
Defendants.

This matter came on regularly

for trial before th»

Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sittin<
without a jury, on the 8th day of July, 1991, at the Garfield Count]
Courthouse in Panguitch, UtahT~-Plaintif fs were present in Court am
represented by their attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm o
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson.

Defendant appeared throug

its President, Dan A. Robison, and was represented by its attorney
J. Bryan Jackson.

And the Plaintiffs, having called witnesses t

testify on their behalf, having offered exhibits and having rested
and the Defendant, having called witnesses to testify on its behalf

having offered exhibits and having rested; and the Court, having
1

heard

2

Findings of Fact from the bench; and the Court, being fully advised

3

in the premises and good cause appearing, now makes and enters the

4

argument

7
8
9
10
11

counsel

and

having

thereafter

made

certain

following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

5
6

of

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On the 28th day April, 1981, Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy

and Winona Sevy (hereinafter "Sevy"), sold to Kyle R. Stewart and
Cindy M. Stewart (hereinafter "Stewart") approximately 12.86 acres
of irrigated farm land located in Garfield County, State of Utah,
together with 28 shares of primary and 11 shares of secondary water
stock in The Long Canal Company.

12
2.

The agreed purchase price for said land and water

13
stock was $25,000.00, with a down payment of $5,000.00 and the
14
balance payable in annual installments with interest at the rate of
15
10% per annum on the unpaid balance.
16
3.

Sevy and Stewart went to Defendant, Security T^tle

17
Company of Southern Utah (hereinafter "Security Title"), to have
18
proper documents prepared and to be protected in the transaction.
19
20
21
22
23
24

4.

It was the intent of Sevy and Stewart that Sevy

transfer title to said land and water stock to Stewart and that
Stewart give to Sevy a lien against said land and water stock to
secure payment of the balance of the purchase price.

5.

The intention of Sevy and Stewart, as set forth in

1

paragraph

2

Security Title before it prepared documents of sale, transfer and

3

security.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

numbered 4 of these Findings of Fact, was stated to

6.

Security Title prepared a Warranty Deed from Sevy to

Stewart, a Note Secured by Deed of Trust in the principal amount of
$20,000.00 from Stewart to Sevy, and a Deed of Trust With Assignment
of Rents against said land and water stock from Stewart to Sevy to
secure payment of said principal amount, interest and all other
amounts described in said Note and Deed of Trust.
7. At the closing of said transaction on April 28, 1981,
at the offices of Security Title in Fanguitch, Utah, Sevy was
requested by Security Title to obtain his water stock certificate,
whereupon Mr. Sevy obtained from his bank deposit box and delivered

14
to Security Title stock certificate numbered 200 representing 112
15
76/100 shares of The Long Canal Company.

Sevy endorsed said stock

16
certificate,

in the presence

of Russell M.

Dalton,

agent

for

17
Security Title, and appointed Security Title as agent to transfer
18
39 shares of said water stock to Stewart on the books of The Long
19
Canal Company.
20
8.

Following said closing, Security Title caused to be

21
recorded at the Garfield County Recorders Office said Warranty Deed
22
and Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents and to be transferred on
23
24

the books of The Long Canal Company 39 shares of the capital stock

thereof to Stewart. The Long Canal Company issued a new certificate
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

numbered 206, representing 28 shares of primary and 11 shares of
secondary water stock, to Stewart.
9.

Thereafter,

said

Warranty

Deed

and

certificate

numbered 206 and copies of said Trust Deed Note and Deed of Trust
With Assignment of Rents were delivered to Stewart and said Trust
Deed Note and Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents, together with
a new certificate representing 73 76/100 shares of The Long Canal
Company were delivered to Sevy.
10.

Both

Sevy

and

Stewart

believed

that

Sevy

was

transferring to Stewart said land and 39 shares of water stock at

11
the time of the transaction and Sevy believed that he had a good and
12
valid first lien against said land and 39 shares of water stock
13

transferred to Stewart to secure payment of the balance of the

14
purchase price.
15
11.

After the recording of said Warranty Deed and Deed

16
of Trust With Assignment of Rents and the transfer of said water
17
stock on the books of The Long Canal Company,

Security

Title

18
delivered all of the documents which it had prepared, together with
19
20
21
22
23
24

certificate numbered 206 representing 39 shares of water stock in
The Long Canal Company which had been issued to Stewart and the
title insurance policy hereinafter described, to Sevy and Stewart.
12.

Security Title failed to obtain a receipt from the

party to whom it delivered the new water stock certificate numbered

I

206 and no instructions were given by either Sevy or Stewart to
Security

Title with

respect

to whom

it

should

deliver

said

certificate.
13.

Although there is a conflict in the evidence as to

whom Security Title delivered said stock certificate numbered 206,
the Court finds, by the greater weight of the evidence, that
Security Title delivered said certificate to Stewart.
14. Security Title made the decision as to what documents
would be prepared and the form the transaction would take, prepared
all of said documents, caused said Warranty Deed and Deed of Trust
With Assignment of Rents to be recorded and said water stock to be
transferred, did all of the title work, served as escrow agent and
as Trustee under said Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents, and
issued an owners title insurance policy to Stewart.
15.

The title insurance policy which was issued by

Security Title to Stewart was for the amount of $25,000.00, the full
amount of the purchase price, notwithstanding the fact that it
covered only the land and did not include said water stock.
16. Sevy paid to Security Title the sum of $75.00 for its
services and the sum of $135.00 as a title insurance premium on the
$25,000.00 title insurance policy issued to Stewart, as aforesaid.
17. Members of the general public rely generally on title
insurance companies to properly prepare documents and conduct real

estate transactions and closings and further rely on what they ar<
1

told by title companies with respect to real estate transactions.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

18.

The custom and practice in the title

insurance

industry, in 1981 and at present, where the sale involves water
stock in an irrigation company with a security interest in favor of
the seller, is that the title insurance company do one of the
following:

delay transferring

the stock on the books of the

corporation until the final payment on the purchase price is made
to seller; make the transfer on the books of the corporation and
hold the new certificate in escrow until the final payment is made;
transfer the stock on the books of the corporation and deliver the
new certificate to the seller with instructions that seller retain
possession of said certificate until final payment is made; or
advise

seller to seek legal counsel.

A failure of the title

insurance company to take at least one of the foregoing steps would
constitute a breach of its duty to the seller.

16
19.

Sevy relied on Security Title to protect him by

17
providing in said transaction a good and valid first lien in his
18
favor against the real property and shares of water stock being sold
19
and transferred to Stewart.
20
20.

Security Title, in this case, breached its duty to

21
22
23
24

Sevy by failing to take at least one of the following steps:

delay

transferring Sevy's water stock to Stewart on the books of The Long
Canal Company until final payment on the purchase price was made;

1

hold the new certificate in escrow after the transfer on the books
of the corporation, until final payment was made; deliver the new
certificate to Sevy with instructions that he retain possession of
it until final payment on the purchase price was made; and advise
Sevy that he should seek the advice of legal counsel.
21.

The preparation of the documents in connection with

the real estate transaction between Sevy and Stewart did not
necessarily

mean

that

Security

Title

was

accepting

the

responsibility as a trustee.
22.

Plaintiff, Harold Sevy, is a farmer, does not have

a formal education, and relied on Security Title to prepare proper
documents and secure his first lien against the real property and
water stock.

Said Plaintiff had, prior to said transaction, been

an officer of The Long Canal Company, but had no knowledge regarding
how to transfer shares and how to perfect security interests
therein.
23.

Plaintiff, Winona Sevy, did nothing more in this

transaction than sign documents as requested by her husband, Harold
Sevy.
24.

Said new certificate numbered 206 made its way to

Stewart, as aforesaid, and on or about the 21st day of August, 1985,
and the 31st day of March, 1986, Stewart borrowed money from The
Lockhart

Company

and

secured

his

loans

by

delivering

said

certificate to The Lockhart Company which perfected its security

interest through a UCC-1 filing with the Utah State Division of
1

Corporations and Commercial Code on September 3, 1985, as Filing No.

2

033326, and by retaining possession of said certificate numbered

3

206.

4
5
6

25.

security interest in Sevy to said water stock was the preparation
and recording of said Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents.

7
8
9

The only step taken by Security Title to provide a

26. Stewart defaulted on its obligations to The Lockhart
Company

and on or about October 2, 1986, The Lockhart

Company

assigned to Associates Financial Services of Utah, Inc. (hereinafter

10
"Associates"), all of its rights against Stewart and delivered to
11
Associates share certificate numbered 206, representing said 39
12
shares of stock in The Long Canal Company.
13
27.

Thereafter, Stewart filed a Petition in Bankruptcy

14
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah and
15
bankruptcy trustee Kenneth Rushton abandoned his interest and the
16
interest of Stewart in and to said 39 shares of capital stock in The
17
Long Canal Company.
18
28.

On or about April 15, 1987, Associates filed suit

19
20
21
22
23
24

against Sevy and Security Title in the Fifth Judicial District Court
of Iron County, State of Utah, seeking a declaration that it was the
holder of a good, valid and sufficient perfected security interest
in and to share certificate 206, including 39 shares of the capital
stock of The Long Canal Company, free and clear of any right, title,
8

(

claim, lien or security interest on the part of Sevy and Security
Title, seeking a decree that it be permitted to foreclose its
security

interest as provided by law without

further claim or

interference by Sevy and Security Title, and seeking an injunction
against Sevy and Security Title from asserting any claim to said
water stock in derogation of Associates' interest or rights.
29.

The first knowledge Sevy had that Stewart had given

a lien against said certificate numbered 206 in favor of a lending
institution was when Sevy was sued by Associates, as aforesaid.
30.

Sevy defended said action by Associates; however,

Security Title neither made an appearance nor otherwise defended
said action.
31.

On or about the 2nd day of November, 1987, the Fifth

Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, entered
summary judgment as follows:
(a)

Entering the default of Security Title;

(b)

Adjudging and decreeing that Associates is the

holder of a good, valid and sufficient perfected security interest
in and to share certificate numbered 206 covering 39 shares of the
capital stock of The Long Canal Company, free and clear of any
adverse right, title, claim, lien or security interest on the part
of Sevy and Security Title;

(c)
1
2

security interest as provided by law without

5
6
7
8

(d)

II

Permanently enjoining and restraining Sevy and

Security Title from asserting any claim to The Long Canal Company
share certificate numbered 206 and the water rights represented
thereby
security

in

derogation

interest

of

in the

or

adverse

same and

to Associates'

from

any

perfected

interference

with

Associates' foreclosure of said security interest.

9
10

further claim or

interference by Sevy and Security Title;

3
4

Giving Associates leave to foreclose its said

32.

On the 21st day of June, 1989, the Utah Court of

Appeals, in an appeal prosecuted by Sevy, affirmed the judgment of
the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah,

12
holding that the security interest of Associates in said water stock
13
is prior to the unperfected security interest of Sevy and that
14
Associates may foreclose.
15
33.

Sevy was justified, under paragraph 4 of the Deed of

16
Trust

With

Assignment

of

Rents,

in

taking

action

he

thought

17
necessary

in defending

the

action

filed by Associates

and

in

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

prosecuting said appeal in order to preserve the security; moreover,
the action taken by Sevy in so doing was reasonable.
34.

Stewart defaulted on its obligation to Sevy arising

out of the sale of said real property and water stock after making
the annual payments for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, and
Sevy, under his contract with Stewart, took possession of said real
10

4

property, but lost all of his right, title and interest in and to
said certificate numbered 206 and the 39 shares of stock in The Long
Canal Company.
35. On the 31st day of August, 1989, Sevy purchased said
water stock from Associates for the sum of $7,250.00 in order to
preserve the entire security described in said Deed of Trust With
Assignment of Rents.
36.

The balance owing on the indebtedness of Stewart to

Sevy is $49,485.00 calculated as follows, with interest to July 1,
1991, to-wit:
Nature of Amount Owing

Principal

Interest

Total

Balance on Note
$14,215.00
Taxes
100.00
Redemption of Water Stock 7,250.00
Costs of Associates
Litigation
10,250.00
Cost of Foreclosure
Action
6.000.00
TOTALS
$37.815.00

$8,173.00
57.00
1,390.00

$22,388.00
157.00
8,640.00

2,050.00

12,300.00

0.00
$11.670.00

6.000.00
$49.485.00

37.

Because of Stewart's bankruptcy, Sevy shall be

entitled to no deficiency against Stewart in the action to foreclose
under said Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents.
38. At the time of said real estate transaction between
Sevy and Stewart, at the present time, and at all times between said
two dates, said water stock had a fair market value of $400.00 per
share on the primary stock and no value on the secondary stock for
a total value of $11,200.00. The current fair market value of the

farm land sold by Sevy to Stewart, with said water stock included,
1

is $14,850.00.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

39.

defending the action of Associates and in prosecuting the appeal
from the judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron
County, State of Utah, as aforesaid, to-wit: the sum of $10,250.00,
were reasonable and were necessarily incurred in Sevy's attempts to
preserve the security under said Deed of Trust With Assignment of
Rents.

9
10
11
12

The attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Sevy in

40.

The amount expended by Sevy in purchasing said water

stock from Associates, to-wit: the sum of $7,250.00, was reasonable
and was necessarily incurred in preserving the security under said
Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents.

13
41.

Security Title's defense of this action, under all

14
the circumstances, is without merit and is not asserted in good
15
faith.
16
42.

Security Title's representation to Sevy, which is

17
implicit in what was said and done by the parties hereto and by
18
Stewart,

that

it was

qualified

to prepare

the

documents

and

19
20
21
22
23
24

orchestrate the transaction, as aforesaid, was deceptive under the
Utah Consumer Protection Act which applies to this case.
43. A reasonable attorneys' fee to be awarded to Sevy in
prosecuting this action is $5,000.00,

together with such additional

fees as appear to the Court to be reasonable for services rendered
12

i

by Sevy's counsel subsequent to the time of trial.

Any such

additional fees shall be determined by the Court on the basis of
affidavits to be filed as follows:

Sevy shall file and serve his

affidavit within ten days after entry of judgment herein and
Security Title shall file and serve its affidavit within ten days
after service of Sevy's affidavit. If the Court finds that any such
additional fees should be awarded, a supplemental judgment shall be
entered for the amount thereof.
To the extent that any of the foregoing Findings of Fact
are more appropriately Conclusions of Law, they shall be deemed to
be such.
On the foregoing Findings of Factf the Court concludes:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy and Winona Sevy, are entitled to
judgment against Defendant, Security Title Company of Southern Utah,
as follows:
1. Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment on the
grounds that on the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and all
of the evidence herein, Defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the applicable
statute of limitations, the statute of frauds or the one action
rule.
2. Adjudging and decreeing that Defendant is entitled to
no award of attorney's fees.
13

3.

For the following amounts:
(a)

The sum of $10,250.00, together with interest thereon at

the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 21st day of June, 1989, to date
of entry of judgment herein;
(b)

The sum of $7,250.00, together with interest thereon at

the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 31st day of August, 1989, to
date of entry.of judgement herein;
(c)

For the sum of $5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees in

prosecuting this action.
(d)

For supplemental judgment for attorneys1 fees, in a

reasonable amount, incurred by Plaintiffs herein since the time of trial
as provided in paragraph numbered 43 of the foregoing Findings of Fact.
(e)

For interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum

on the maounts of said judgment and supplemental judgment from the dates
of entry thereof until paid, together with Plaintiffs' costs of suit
herein incurred.
To the extent that any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law shall
more appropriately be Findings of Fact-they shall be deemed to be such.
Mr. Robert F. Orton, Attorney for the Plaintiffs, to prepare
the

Decree.

Dated thisAfe^^Sty^^f September, 1991

i

1
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
On the^K / day of September, 1991, I mailed a copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in case No. 3375, to
<

the following, postage prepaid, from offices at Manti, Utah:
J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant
111 North Main, P.O. Box 519, Cedar City, Utah, 84720
Robert F. Orton, Attorney for Plaintiff
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101

APPENDIX C
JUDGMENT

OCT 2 3 1991.

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY

i

STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD SEVY and WINONA
SEVY,
J U D G M E N T
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 3375

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly

for trial before the

Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting
without a jury, on the 8th day of July, 1991, at the Garfield County
Courthouse in Panguitch, Utah. Plaintiffs were present in Court and
represented by their attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson.

Defendant appeared through

its President, Dan A. Robison, and was represented by its attorney,
J. Bryan Jackson.

And the Plaintiffs, having called witnesses to

testify on their behalf, having offered exhibits and having rested;
and the Defendant, having called witnesses to testify on its behalf,
having offered exhibits and having rested; and the Court, having
heard argument of counsel and having thereafter made limited
Findings of Fact from the bench; and the Court being fully advised

in the premises and having, on the 26th day of September, 1991,
executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and said Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law having been entered hereon on the
30th day of September, 1991; and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1. That Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy and Winona Sevy, be and
they are hereby awarded

judgment

in their favor and against

Defendant, Security Title Company of Southern Utah, in the sum and
amount of TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN DOLLARS AND
SEVENTY-SIX CENTS ($26,411.76), which includes interest as provided
in said Conclusions of Law computed to October 15, 1991, together
with interest on said sum and amount at the rate of twelve per cent
(12%) per annum from the date of entry of this Judgment until paid
and Plaintiffs' taxable costs herein incurred.
2.

Plaintiffs shall be entitled to a Supplemental

Judgment against Defendant for attorney's fees appearing to the
Court to be reasonable for services rendered to Plaintiffs since the
time of trial.

Such additional fees shall be determined by the

Court on the basis of affidavits to be filed and served as follows:
Plaintiffs shall file and serve their Affidavit within ten (10) days
after entry of this Judgment and Defendant shall file and serve its
Affidavit

within ten

(10) days after

service of Plaintiffs'

Affidavit. The amount which the Court finds, based upon said
2

Affidavits, to be reasonable for services rendered to Plaintiffs
since the time of trial shall be reflected in a Supplemental
Judgment which shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against <
Defendants for the amount thereof.
DATED this

/ tf " day of October, 1991.
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
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SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 3375
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF
SOUTHERN UTAH,
Defendant.
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This natter cane on regularly for trial before the Honorable
Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a
jury, on the 8th day of July, 1991, at the Garfield County
Courthouse in Panguitch, Utah.

Plaintiffs

were present in court

and represented by their attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson.

Defendant appeared through

its president, Dan A. Robison, and was represented by its
attorney, J. Brian Jackson.

And the Plaintiffs, having called

witnesses to testify on their behalf, having offered exhibits and
having rested;

and the Defendant, having called witnesses to

testify on its behalf, having offered exhibits and having rested;
and the Court, having heard argument of counsel and having
thereafter made limited Findings of Fact from the bench;

and the

Court having thereafter, on the 26th day of September, 1991,

executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav and said Findings
1

i| of Fact and Conclusions of Law having been entered herein on the

2

30th day of September, 1991;

3

Judgment on the 18th day of October, 1991, and Judgment having

4

been entered on the 23rd of October, 1991; and Plaintiffs,

5

pursuant to the provisions of said Findings of Fact and

6

Conclusions of Law and said Judgnent, having filed and served

7

Affidavit of Robert F. Orton in Support of Post Trial Attorney's

8

Fees and having further filed and served their Memorandum of Costs

9

and Necessary Disburseaents;

and the Court having executed

and the tine for Defendant to file

10

an affidavit in opposition to post trial attorney's fees, under

11

the terns of said Findings and Judgnent, have expired; and the

12

time in which to file a notion to tax costs under the rules having

13

expired;

14

good cause appearing,

15
16
17
18

and the Court being fully advised in the prenises and

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that Plaintiffs, Harold Sevy and Winona Sevy, be and they are
hereby awarded Supplemental Judgnent in their favor and against
Defendant, Security Title Company of Southern Utah in the sun and

19
amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS ($3,590.00)
20
as and for post trial attorney's fees, together with their costs
21
and necessary disbursements herein in the anount of ONE THOUSAND
22
THREE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE AND 40/100 DOLLARS ($1,345.40). This
23
Supplemental Judgnent shall carry interest at the rate of twelve
24
per-cent (12%) per annum from the date of entry thereof until
paid.
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

EMILY ORTON, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed in the law firm of MARSDEH, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFRBDSON,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein;

that she served the attached

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT upon the party listed below by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the
following and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage
prepaid, on the ^itL

day of November, 1991.

J. Bryan Jackson, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
ill North Main
P.O. Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84720

fn*iL OsltoYI
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before
October, 1991.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at
My Commission Expires:

this

day of
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APPENDIX E
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Sevy v. Security Title Company, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (1993)
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Code*Co
Provo, Utah

it seems to me this is quite a clear cut, straightforward irrigated farm land, located in Garfield County,
matter of confession, admissions that were completely Utah, along with 39 shares of water stock in the
voluntary from all the testimony that was given. There Long Canal Company, which furnished
has been no evidence they were involuntary in any irrigation water to the land. Mr. Sevy is a
way as actual voluntariness or legal voluntariness." farmer and long time officer of the Long Canal
The prosecutor further argued, "Your Honor, I Company. The purchase price for the land and
believe the cases are entirely in support of the State's
position, this was a voluntary statement by the water stock was $25,000, with a down payment
defendant. . . . It is entirely legal and voluntary as of $5000 and annual installments on the unpaid
well." Although the court failed to specifically rule on balance.
The Sevys and the Stewarts requested that
the issue, it did so implicitly by denying VillarreaTs
Russell Dalton, the office manager of Security
motion to suppress.
11. Villarreal also contends that his confession should Title Company of Southern Utah, prepare
have been suppressed because the State failed to documents to protect their respective interests in
contemporaneously create a record of his confession. the transaction. The parties told Dalton they
Although we do not endorse the particular manner in wanted to transfer the title to the land and the
which Villarreal's confession was recorded, see Suae water stock to the Stewarts, with the Sevys
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989), there is no
basis, in light of the totality of circumstances retaining a hen against the land and the water
surrounding the confession, for suppression of the stock to secure payment of the balance of the
Security Title prepared all of the
confession merely because it was not purchase price.
documents,1 recorded the warranty deed and
contemporaneously recorded.
deed of trust with assignment of rents,
transferred the water stock, and issued a title
insurance policy to the Stewarts. Mr. Sevy paid
CiteM
Security Title a $75 escrow fee and a $135 title
218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34
insurance premium on the title insurance policy
issued to the Stewarts.
At the closing, Dalton requested that Mr. Sevy
INTHE
deliver his water stock certificate representing
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
112 shares of the Long Canal Company to
Security Title. In Dalton's presence, Mr. Sevy
endorsed the certificate and appointed Security
Harold SEVY and Winona Sevy,
Title as agent to transfer 39 of the 112 shares to
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
the Stewarts on the books of the Long Canal
v.
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF Company. The Long Canal Company then
issued a new certificate representing 39 shares
SOUTHERN UTAH,
of stock in the Stewarts' name, and sent the
Defendant and Appellant
certificate to Security Title. The company also
sent a separate certificate for the remaining 73
So. 920035-CA
shares
in Mr. Sevy's name to Security Title.
FILED: July 29, 1993
Security Title sent this 73 share certificate to
Mr. Sevy soon after the closing.
Sixth District, Garfield County
At the trial on July 8, 1991, the testimony was
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs
in conflict as to the delivery of the 39 share
water stock certificate, undoubtedly because of
ATTORNEYS:
the ten years which had passed since the 1981
I nice A. Maak and Jeffrey J. Hunt, Salt Lake
closing. Mr. Stewart testified that Mr. Sevy
City, and J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for
gave him the closing documents and the 39
Appellant
share certificate. Mrs. Stewart testified she
:obert F. Orton and Clark R. Nielsen, Salt
received the certificate from her husband shortly
Lake City, for Appellees
after the closing and that he told her he received
it from Mr. Sevy. However, Mr. Sevy denied
efore Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.
delivering the certificate to the Stewarts. Dalton
testified he had no recollection regarding the
This opinion is subject to revision before
delivery of the certificate or anything else about
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
the transaction. Based upon this testimony, the
trial court found that Security Title delivered the
[LLINGS, Presiding Judge:
39 share certificate to the Stewarts.
Appellant, Security Title Company, appeals
On August 21, 1985, the Stewarts borrowed
om a judgment determining it was negligent in money from the Lockhart Company, pledging
osing a real estate transaction for Appellees, the 39 shares of water stock as collateral. The
irold and Winona Sevy. We reverse as we Lockhart Company perfected its security interest
nclude the Sevys' claim is time-barred.
by taking possession of the 39 share certificate
and through filing a financing statement with the
FACTS
Utah State Division of Corporations and
On April 28, 1981, Harold and Winona Sevy Commercial Code on September 3, 1985. On
Id Kyle and Cindy Stewart 12.86 acres of October 2, 1986, the Lockhart Company
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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assigned Associates Financial Services of Utah, there was no foreclosure completed on the
Inc. all of its rights against the Stewarts and property secured under the deed of trust; (4)
delivered to Associates Financial the 39 share The trial court erred by awarding as damages
water stock certificate.
the attorney fees and costs the Sevys incurred in
In 1986, the Stewarts defaulted on their the action filed against them by Associates
payments to the Sevys and the Sevys repossessed Financial; and (5) The trial court erred in
the farm land. Thereafter, the Stewarts filed a awarding the Sevys attorney fees and costs
petition in bankruptcy.
incurred in this action. Additionally, Security
Associates Financial filed suit against the Title seeks its costs incurred below and on this
Sevys and Security Title, to establish the priority appeal. We do not reach many of the issues
of its security interest in the 39 shares of water raised on appeal because we conclude the Sevys'
stock on April 15,1987. The Sevys defended on action against Security Title is time-barred.
the merits. On November 2, 1987, summary
judgment was entered in favor of Associates
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Financial. On August 31, 1989, the Sevys
Security Title argues the trial court erred as a
repurchased the 39 shares of water stock from matter of law in concluding the Sevys' claim
Associates Financial for $7250.
was not barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3)
The Sevys filed the lawsuit from which this (1992), the four year negligence statute of
appeal arises against Security Title on December limitations. The Sevys respond that the trial
27, 1989. They alleged Security Title was court correctly applied the discovery rule to toll
negligent in not protecting their security interest the statute of limitations.2
in the water stock. Security Title moved for
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that
summary judgment on the ground that the statutes of limitations " "are designed to promote
Sevys' claim was barred under the applicable justice by preventing surprises through the
statute of limitations. The trial court denied the revival of claims that have been allowed to
motion.
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
On September 26, 1991, after a bench trial, have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'"
the court found Security Title was negligent. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah
The trial court determined the custom and 1981) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers
practice in the title industry, in a sale involving v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
water stock in an irrigation company where a 348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)). In
seller wishes to retain a security interest, furtherance of that policy, the general rule is "a
required an escrow agent to either: (1) delay cause of action accrues and the relevant statute
transferring the stock on the books of the of limitations begins to run "upon the happening
corporation until the final payment on the of the last event necessary to complete the cause
purchase price is made to the seller, (2) make of action . . . [and] mere ignorance of the
the transfer on the books of the corporation and existence of a cause of action does not prevent
hold the new certificate in escrow until the final the running of the statute of limitations.'"
payment is made, (3) transfer the stock on the Warren v. Provo Gty Corp., 838 P.2d 1125,
books of the corporation and deliver the new 1128-29 (Utah 1992) (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d
certificate to the seller with instructions that the at 86); see also O'Neal v. Division of Family
seller retain possession of the certificate until Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991).
final payment is made, or (4) advise the seller to
Under the general rule, the statute of
seek legal counsel. The trial court determined limitations ran on the Sevys' claim several years
that Security Title breached its duty to the Sevys before this action was filed. However, the trial
by failing to take any one of these steps..
court concluded the discovery rule saved the
Furthermore, the court awarded the Sevys Sevys' claim.
attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the
Whether the discovery rule applies to toll the
Associates Financial action and the amount spent statute of limitations is a question of law, thus
by the Sevys in repurchasing the water stock we "show no deference to the trial court's ruling
from Associates Financial. In addition, the court on appeal, but we review it for correctness."
found Security Title's defense of this action was Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah
without merit and was not asserted in good faith 1990).
and thus awarded attorney fees. As an
The Utah Supreme Court has identified
alternative ground for the award of attorney fees
three circumstances where the discovery
in this case, the court also found Security Title's
rule applies: (1) in situations where the
representation to the Sevys that it was qualified
discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in
to prepare the documents and orchestrate the
situations where a plaintiff does not become
transaction was deceptive under the Utah
aware of the cause of action because of the
Consumer Protection Act.
defendant's concealment or misleading
On appeal, Security Title argues: (1) The
conduct; and (3) in situations where the case
Sevys' claim is time-barred under the statute of
presents exceptional circumstances and the
limitations; (2) The trial court's finding that
application of the general rule would be
Security Title delivered the stock certificate to
irrational or unjust, regardless of any
the Stewarts was clearly erroneous; (3) The trial
showing that the defendant has prevented the
court erred in awarding the Sevys damages when
discovery of the cause of action.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Warrai, 838 P.2d at 1129 (footnotes omitted);
accord Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872; Myers, 635
P.2d at 86.
There is no Utah statute mandating application
of the discovery rule in a negligence action
against a title company. Furthermore, the Sevys
have not asserted, nor did the trial court find,
that Security Title misled the Sevys regarding
their cause of action against Security Title.
Thus, it is the third instance, the judicially
created equitable "exceptional circumstances"
rule which we analyze on appeal.

Tide Co.
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had a good and valid first lien against said
land and 39 shares of water stock
transferred to Stewart to secure payment of
the balance of the purchase price.
17. Members of the general public rely
generally on title [agents] to properly
prepare documents and conduct real estate
transactions and closings and further rely on
what they are told by title companies with
respect to real estate transactions.

19. Sevy relied on Security Title to protect
him by providing in said transaction a good
A. Discovery Requirement
and valid first lien in his favor against the
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Warren
real property and shares of water stock
v. Provo Gty Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah
being sold and transferred to Stewart.
1992), that to qualify under the exceptional
circumstances exception, the plaintiff must make
22. Plaintiff, Harold Sevy, is a farmer, does
an "initial showing" that "the plaintiff did not
not have a formal education, and relied on
know of and could not reasonably have known
Security Title to prepare proper documents
of the existence of the cause of action in time to
and secure his first hen against the real
file a claim within the limitation period." Id. at
property and water stock. Said Plaintiff had,
1129. This is a threshold requirement.3 O'Neal
prior to said transaction, been an officer in
v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139,
The Long Canal Company, but had no
1144 (Utah 1992). In Warren, the plaintiff was
knowledge regarding how to transfer shares
a pilot who had been injured in a crash of an
and how to perfect security interests therein.
airplane he had leased from a flying club. After
the crash, the plaintiff brought an action against
23. Plaintiff, Winona Sevy, did nothing
the city for the city's failure to enforce an
more in this transaction than sign documents
ordinance regulating flying clubs. The ordinance
as requested by her husband, Harold Sevy.
required flying clubs to assure that their
airplanes were airworthy, to maintain insurance,
25. The first knowledge Sevy had that
and to file a certificate of insurance at the
Stewart had given a lien against said
airport. The city argued the plaintiffs claim was
certificate numbered 206 [representing the
time-barred because it was filed after the
39 shares of water stock] in favor of a
applicable statute of limitations had run. The
lending institution was when Sevy was sued
plaintiff argued the discovery rule should be
by Associates [Financial], as aforesaid.
applied to his claim because he did not have The court supplements this with an oral finding
reasonable grounds to believe the city was not on discovery:
enforcing its ordinances until after the statute of
1 find against the Defendant on the Statute
limitations had run. The court determined the
of Limitation. . . . The Court makes a
plaintiffs claim did not qualify under the
finding that the Statute of Limitations would
exceptional circumstances exception because the
commence as of the time of the discovery,
fact that the plane crashed gave the plaintiff
which was the filing of the [Associates
reason to question whether Provo city was
Financial] lawsuit.
enforcing its ordinance requiring the flying club
We agree with Security Title that the findings
to keep its airplanes in an airworthy condition. are not crystal clear as to when the Sevys
The court further concluded that since the reasonably should have known of Security
plaintiffs counsel had contacted the airport Title's failure to protect their security interest.
within the statutory period about the ordinance However, we hold that even if the trial court can
that he knew or should have known of its be credited with finding that the Sevys could not
requirements. Id. at 1129.
have reasonably known Security Title did not
Therefore, for the Sevys to benefit from the protect their security interest in the 39 shares
discovery rule, and not have their claim barred until they were put on notice of the Associates
by the four-year statute of limitations, the trial Financial lawsuit, the court's finding is clearly
court had to find the Sevys neither knew of erroneous.
Security Title's failure to protect their security
Mr. Sevy knew the water stock had been
interest in the water shares, nor should have transferred to the Stewarts' name, as he
reasonably known of this failure until four years cooperated in the transfer. In addition, Mr. Sevy
before they filed their lawsuit.
knew or should have known there was no
In its written findings of fact the trial court ongoing escrow at Security Title because there
was no document reflecting any ongoing escrow
stated:
given to him at closing. Furthermore, the Sevys
10. Both Sevy and Stewart believed that
received the 73 share certificate in their name
Sevy was transferring to Stewart said land
soon after the closing. Mr. Sevy testified that he
and 39 shares of water stock at the time of
knew he did not receive the certificate
the transaction and Sevy believed that he
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Code*Co
Provo, Utah

representing the 39 shares of w
had been transferred into the
Nothing prevented the Sev;
Security Title about the 39 si
certificate and how Security Til
their interest in those water shi
as an officer of the Long Cai
more than forty years, Mr. Sev
stock certificate was valuable
In fact, Mr. Sevy kept his c
certificate in a safe deposit t
these facts we think the Sevys <
have discovered that Security 1
protect their security interest in
water stock long before the Asa
lawsuit was filed and at a time
their action being time-barred.
B. Balancing Ti
The court in Warren v. Prove
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) expli
plaintiff meets the threshold dis
the reviewing court moves to tl
which is what "[t]he ultimate
whether a case presenl
circumstances that render the
statute of limitations irrational
on." Id. at 1129. As note.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (1
applying the balancing test a c<
the hardship the statute of li
impose on the plaintiff against
the defendant resulting from dif
caused by the passage of time
also Klinger v. Kightly, 791
(Utah 1990).
Although we need not reach t
discovery rule because the Sev
meet the threshold reason
requirement, we note that the a
discovery rule would create sigr
of proof for Security Title. Sec
witness Russell Dalton, who pr
documents in the transaction, hf
the critical facts. Dalton testify
not have any specific recollect
transaction. He could not reme
the water certificate to Mr. Ste^
advised Mr. Sevy to get an attoi
advised Mr. Sevy to put the doc
place, or whether he advised I
turn the water stock over to the\
the promissory note beii
Furthermore, the Stewarts testil
the transaction was lost and
remember many of the details of
Were we to reach a balancing
we would conclude this is not
case where the statute of limit
tolled to allow a stale, ten-year
litigated. We cannot say it wouk
unjust to bar the Sevys' clai
witness for Security Title had n
the transaction, which, in effect
Title the opportunity to refute tf
testimony of Mr. Sevy on criti
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representing the 39 shares of water stock, which
had been transferred into the Stewarts' name.
Nothing prevented the Sevys from asking
Security Title about the 39 share water stock
certificate and how Security Title was protecting
their interest in those water shares. In addition,
as an officer of the Long Canal Company for
more than forty years, Mr. Sevy knew the water
stock certificate was valuable and transferable.
In fact, Mr. Sevy kept his own water stock
certificate in a safe deposit box. Based upon
these facts we think the Sevys could and should
have discovered that Security Title had failed to
protect their security interest in the 39 shares of
water stock long before the Associates Financial
lawsuit was filed and at a time which results in
their action being time-barred.
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would be true in most title transactions that
occurred ten years earlier.

DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES
Because of our resolution of the statute of
limitations issue, we also vacate the award of
damages to the Sevys, including the Associates
Financial attorney fees awarded as consequential
damages. We also vacate the award of attorney
fees to the Sevys for this action because there is
no legal basis for the award. The trial court
awarded attorney fees to the Sevys in this action
based on two statutory provisions. First, the
court concluded Security Title's actions were
deceptive under the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act (UCSPA). See Utah Code Ann.
§13-11-1 to -20 (1989 & Supp. 1992). Second,
the court concluded attorney fees were
recoverable under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56
B. Balancing Test
The court in Warren v. Provo Oty Corp., 838 (1992) because Security Title's defense was
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) explained that if the asserted without merit and not in good faith.
plaintiff meets the threshold discovery test, then The UCSPA provides no basis upon which to
the reviewing court moves to the balancing test, award the Sevys attorney fees in this action. The
which is what "(t]he ultimate determination of Sevys failed to plead a cause of action under the
whether a case presents exceptional UCSPA, and certainly did not prove one.
circumstances that render the application of a Additionally, Security Title's defense certainly
statute of limitations irrational or unjust turns was not without merit under §78-27-56 as we
on." Id. at 1129. As noted in Myers v. have ruled in its favor on appeal.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), in
applying the balancing test a court will balance
CONCLUSION
the hardship the statute of limitations would
We conclude the Sevys have not met the
impose on the plaintiff against any prejudice to threshold requirement to toll the statute of
the defendant resulting from difficulties of proof limitations under the
"exceptional
caused by the passage of time. Id. at 87; see circumstances" discovery rule. The Sevys could
also Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 and should have reasonably discovered that
(Utah 1990).
Security Title had failed to protect their security
Although we need not reach this prong of the interest before 1987 and thus their action is
discovery rule because the Sevys have failed to time-barred. We therefore vacate the award of
meet the threshold reasonable discovery damages and attorney ftes to the Sevys. We also
requirement, we note that the application of the award costs to Security Title.
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge
discovery rule would create significant problems
of proof for Security Title. Security Title's key
WE CONCUR:
witness Russell Dalton, who prepared all of the
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
documents in the transaction, had no memory of
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
the critical facts. Dalton testified at trial he did
not have any specific recollection of the sales
transaction. He could not remember if he gave 1. Security Title prepared: (1) a warranty deed
the water certificate to Mr. Stewart, whether he conveying the land from the Sevys to the Stewarts, (2)
advised Mr. Sevy to get an attorney, whether he a note secured by a deed of trust in the principal
advised Mr. Sevy to put the documents in a safe amount of $20,000 from the Stewarts to the Sevys, (3)
a deed of trust with assignment of rents against the
place, or whether he advised Mr. Sevy not to land and water stock from the Stewarts to the Sevys,
turn the water stock over to the Stewarts prior to and (4) an owners title insurance policy for the
the promissory note being paid off. Stewarts for $25,000, the full amount of the purchase
Furthermore, the Stewarts testified their file on price, which did not include the water stock but only
the transaction was lost and they could not covered the land.
remember many of the details of the transaction. 2. The Sevys, in the section of their brief addressing
Were we to reach a balancing of the equities, their discovery rule argument, in two sentences
we would conclude this is not the exceptional followed by a less than supportive citation, also assert
case where the statute of limitations should be their claim is not time-barred because they were not
tolled to allow a stale, ten-year old claim to be damaged until 1987 when they could not foreclose
litigated. We cannot say it would be irrational or their security interest. We refuse to consider this issue
unjust to bar the Sevys' claim. The crucial on appeal as it was inadequately addressed. See State
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992).
witness for Security Title had no recollection of 3.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held the
the transaction, which, in effect, denied Security plaintiff must meet this threshold test before the
Title the opportunity to refute the self-interested discovery rule will be applied. See Atwood v. Sturm,
testimony of Mr. Sevy on critical factors. This
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Ruger <t Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992)
(ruling plaintiffs products liability claim against
manufacturer of plaintiffs pistol was time-barred
because statute of limitations began to run on date of
injury even though plaintiff did not learn the injury
may have been caused by a product defect until
several months before the statute of limitations
expired); Allen v. Ortez\ 802 P.2d 1307, 1313-14
(Utah 1990) (applying discovery rule to libel action
because court held plaintiffs did not know, and could
not reasonably have known, of underlying facts giving
rise to their cause of action); Brigham Young Univ. v.
Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah
1987) (stating discovery rule did not apply because
plaintiff knew of leakage and improper pipe
insulation, which gave rise to its cause of action, three
and a half years before the statute of limitations period
expired); Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196,
1199 (Utah 1987) (declining to apply discovery rule in
personal injury action because conditions which
caused injury were patent); Christiansen v. Reest 436
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1968) (holding discovery rule
applied to medical malpracticeaction becauseplaintiff,
in exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have
discovered presence of foreign object in his body
before statute of limitations ran).
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jacqui C. WALLS,
Petitioner,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of
Utah; Uninsured Employers9 Fund; and
Uncle Baits,
Respondents.
No. 920499-CA
FILED: July 2 9 , 1 9 9 3
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Robert Breeze, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
Benjamin A. Sims and Thomas C. Sturdy,
Salt LakeCity, for Respondents
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
Jacqui C. Walls appeals a final order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah denying her
workers' compensation benefits under Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988). We affirm.

Code»Co
PTOVO, Utah

FACTS
On December 29, 1989, Walls was employed
as a bartender at Uncle Baits, an Ogden bar.
Following her daytime shift, which ended at
5:00, she remained at the bar to socialize, shoot
pool and drink beer. Sometime between 10:30
p.m. and 11:00 p.m., approximately six hours
after her shift had ended, Walls became aware
that a keg of beer was empty. Without being
asked to do so, Walls went into the back room
to prepare another keg to be tapped. As she
opened the door to the refrigerator where the
kegs were stored, a keg slid out and crushed her
foot.
Seeking compensation for her sustained
injuries, Walls filed an application for a hearing
before an administrative law judge ( A D ) of the
Industrial Commission of Utah on March 27,
1990. Following the hearing, the ALJ denied
Walls's claim, holding that her injury did not
"arise out of and in the course o r her
employment, as to meet the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988). Wails
thereafter filed a request for review by the
Industrial Commission, which request was
denied.
The sole issue presented for review is whether
the Industrial Commission properly denied Walls
workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA) applies to all proceedings commenced
on or after January 1, 1988. Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-22(2) (1989). Thus, we review Walls's
appeal under post-UAPA law.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) (1989)
provides:
The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law . . . .
As to the application of this section, we have
stated:
With the adoption of UAPA, deference to
an agency's statutory construction should be
given only "when there is a grant of
discretion to the agency concerning the
language in question, either expressly made
in the statute or implied from the statutory
language/ Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581,
589 (Utah 1991). Where there exists a grant
of discretion, "we will not disturb the
Board's application of its factual findings to
the law unless its determination exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.M
Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775
P.2d 439,442 (Utah App. 1989). "lAJbsent
a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error
standard is used in reviewing an agency's
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WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
COMPANY OF UTAH, I N C . , a

Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
HAROLD SEVY; WINONA R. SEVY:
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF
SOUTHERN UTAH, a Utah
Corporation, as Trustee; and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No. 87-146

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter was submitted to the Court without
oral argument under Rule 2.8
District

of the Rules of Practice in the

Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah for

ruling on Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment" dated May 29,
1987, and for ruling on the "Motion to Dismiss" of Defendants
SEVY, dated June 9, 1987.

The Court reviewed the files and

records of the case insofar as they related to said motions,
including

Plaintiff's

"Verified Complaint", the

"Affidavit of

Harold Sevy in Support of Motion of Defendants, Sevy, for Change
of Venue", the "Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion of Defendants Sevy, for Change of Venue", the "Memorandum
Opposing Defendants' Motion for Change of Venue and Supporting

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment", the "Order Overruling
and Denying Motion for Change of Venue", the Counter-Affidavit of
Defendant,

Harold

Sevy",

the

"Affidavit

of Gerald W. Stoker,

P. E. ", the "Affidavit of James P. Yardley", the Supplementary
Memorandum Supporting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Opposing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss", the "Statement of Points
and Authorities
Dismiss

and

in Support

in Opposition

of Motion of Defendants, Sevy, to
to

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment", the "Affidavit of Clark Dennett", the "Affidavit of
Lynda

Hollerman",

the

Supplementary

Memorandum

Supporting

Defendant Sevy's (sic) Motion to Dismiss and Opposing Plaintiff's
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment",

and

Plaintiff's

Reply

to

Supplementary Memorandum Supporting Defendant Sevy's (sic) Motion
to Dismiss and Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment".
The

Court

noted

from

the file

that

Defendant

SECURITY TITLE

COMPANY OF SOUTHERN UTAH, a Utah corporation, as Trustee, was
duly served with process within the State of Utah on April 16,
1987, and thereafter failed to appear and answer or otherwise
defend within the time required by law.

The Court having made

and entered its Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, good
cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1.

That the default of Defendant SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF

UTAH, a Utah corporation, as Trustee, should be and it hereby is,
entered.

2.

That Plaintiff should be and hereby is, awarded default

judgment against Defendant SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OP SOUTHERN
UTAH, a Utah corporation, as Trustee.
3.

That summary judgment should be and hereby is, entered

against Defendants HAROLD SEVY and WINONA P. SEVY, in favor of
Plaintiff ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY OF UTAH, INC., a
Utah corporation.
4.

That

sufficient,

Plaintiff
perfected

is the holder
security

of

interest

a good, valid
in

and

to

and

share

certificate 206, covering 39 shares of the capital stock in The
Long Canal Company, free and clear of any adverse right, title,
claim, lien or security interest on the part of Defendants SEVY
and/or SECURITY TITLE COMPANY.
5.

That Plaintiff may foreclose its security interest in

The Long Canal Company share certificate 206 as provided by law,
without further claim or interference by Defendants.
6.

Defendants

SEVY and

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, and any

claiming by, through or under them, should be and hereby are,
permanently enjoined and restrained from asserting any claim to
The Long Canal Company share certificate 206 and the water rights
represented thereby in derogation of or adverse to Plaintiff's
perfected

security

interference

with

interest
Plaintiff's

interest.
-3-

in

the

same,

foreclosure

of

and
said

from

any

security

i

7.

That

Plaintiff

should

be

and hereby

is, awarded its

costs of Court upon filing of an appropriate memorandum of costs
and disbursements.
DATED this ^ ^

day of ^?t&v^t^e^^,

1987.

BY THE COURT:

^>
3/

Ce^C4-

PHILIP EVEjB, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the %&
I mailed

a

full,

true

and

correct

day of A/fll'SfrlflEg. , 1987,
copy

of

the within and

foregoing SUMMARY AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT, to Mr. Robert F. Orton,
Esq., of Marsden, Orton & Cahoon, Attorneys at Law, at 68 South
Main,

Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, by first-class

mail, postage fully prepaid.

-f^m MftMnvJenyi J
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Cite as

1 Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by
111 Utah Adv. Rep. 63
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987).
IN T H E
1. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985)
(citation omitted) seet Garff Realty Co. v. Better
Buildings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842, 844 ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
(1951).
COMPANY OF UTAH, INC.,
3. The requirement that the event occur after forPlaintiff and Respondent,
mation of the contract distinguishes a case of supev.
rvening impossibility, such as this, from a case in Harold SEVY; Winona R. Sevy; Security Title
which the contract cannot be performed because of Company of Southern Utah, as Trustee; and
a mistake, an unknown legal requirement, or other
John Does I through V,
fact in existence at the time the contract is made. See
Defendants and Appellants.
Quaghana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538
P.2d 301, 305-08 (Utah 1975); Sine v. Rudy, 27
Utah 2d 67, 493 P.2d 299 (1972); Mooney v. GR No. 880459-CA
FILED: June 21,1989
and Assoc., 746 P.2d 1174,1176 (Utah App. 1987).
4. See Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582
P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("[A] party may be reli- Fifth District, Iron County
eved of performing an obligation under a contract Honorable J. Philip Eves
where supervening events, unforeseeable at the time
the contract is made, render performance of the ATTORNEYS:
contract impossible"; the defense did not prevail Robert F. Orton, Virginia Curtis Lee, Salt
because evidence was insufficient); Transatlantic
Lake City, for Appellants
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Restatement (Second) of Contracts Willard R. Bishop, Cedar City, for
Respondent
section 261; J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 476
et seq. (2d ed. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §70A-2- Before Judges Conder,1 Garff, and
615(a) (1980) establishes the impossibility defense in Greenwood.
contracts for the sale of goods.
5. We recognize that the City's failure to approve
OPINION
seems, from our present perspective, to be rather
easy to foresee. However, the critical fact is not
whether the event could have been foreseen, but CONDER, Judge:
rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it
The Defendants Harold and Winona Sevy
and provide accordingly in their contract. A dictum appeal from a judgment of the district court
in one Utah case on impossibility employs the word permitting Associates Financial Services
"unforeseeable" in describing the event causing Company of Utah ("Associates") to foreclose
impossibility, Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.,
582 P.2d at 61 (Utah 1978); however, the better and their interest in certain irrigation company
more widely accepted rule looks not to whether the stock. We affirm.
In 1981, the Sevys sold about thirteen acres
parties could or should have foreseen the event, but
rather whether, as a fact of assent, they did foresee of land in Garfield County to Kyle and Cindy
it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261 & Stewart, along with 39 shares of the Long
comment b (1981).
Canal Company, which for many years had
6. The trial court made no finding expressly deter- furnished irrigation water to the land.2 To
mining when performance became impossible; secure payment of the purchase price, the
however, since the parties do not contest the matter Sevys were beneficiaries of a trust deed coveof timing, we presume the trial court's decision to
ring both the land and the irrigation company
be correct in this regard. We therefore do not consider whether the award of rent for the period pre- stock. The trust deed was duly recorded. The
ceding abandonment was erroneous, because the Long Canal Company issued a stock certificross-appeal of that award is based solely on the cate for the 39 shares in the names of the
argument that Nichols erred in executing the lease, Stewarts, and this stock certificate remained in
an argument which we rejected above.
the Stewarts' possession.
7. See, Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah
In 1985, the Stewarts obtained a loan from
1976); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §265 the Lockhart Company, pledging the canal
(1981); J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 495-96 company stock as collateral. The Lockhart
(2d ed. 1977).
Company took possession of the stock certif8. We distinguish Jespersen v. Deseret News Publishing Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P.2d 1050 (1951) and icate and filed a financing statement covering
General Ins. Co. of America v. Christiansen Furni-the stock. A year later, the Stewarts refinature Co., 119 Utah 470, 229 P.2d 298 (1951) because nced their loan and borrowed from Lockhart
they are based on an argument not raised below or additional funds secured by the same collatin this court. At common law, the application of the eral, bringing the total principal debt to
usual contract defenses to a covenant to pay rent $ 12,213 at 16.597o interest. Lockhart thereafter
was limited. We do not reach the question whether assigned the loan and security interest, and
this rule could apply in this case, because it has not transferred possession of the stock certificate,
been argued.
to Associates.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Stewarts filed a petition in bankruptcy, and
the trustee abandoned the irrigation company
stock. Associates thereupon sued to establish
the priority of its security interest in the stock.
The trial court concluded that the stock was
appurtenant to the land and that the Sevys'
security interest would thus have priority
superior to that of Associates, but that the
Sevys were estopped from asserting the priority of their security interest because they
permitted the Stewarts to retain possession of
the stock certificate. Judgment was accordingly entered on November 4, 1987* permitting
Associates to foreclose the Sevys* security
interest.
The Sevys filed notice of appeal designating
the Court of Appeals as the appellate court.
The Iron County Clerk treated the appeal as
to the Supreme Court, and further filings and
motions prior to briefing were made in the
Supreme Court. The case was eventually transferred by the Supreme Court to this Court.
Associates asserts a lack of appellate jurisdiction based on the fact that the notice of
appeal indicates that the appeal is taken to the
Court of Appeals. Appellate jurisdiction in
this type of case is properly in the Supreme
Court,4 and therefore, the Sevys' notice of
appeal was incorrect in stating that the appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals. However,
the rules of both Courts recognize that such
an error is inconsequential.5 Moreover, the
error caused no real harm in this case, because
all filings and proceedings on appeal were
before the Supreme Court until the case was
transferred here, despite the error on the
notice of appeal. Since the purpose of the
notice of appeal is fundamentally to give
notice that an appeal has been taken,* and
since no party or court seems to have been
misinformed by the error, we find that the
notice of appeal is sufficient to establish
appellate jurisdiction, despite the error in
specifying the appropriate appellate court.
We turn to the question of the relative priorities of the parties' security interests7 in the
irrigation company stock, a question of first
impression. The trial court based its decision
that the Sevys had superior priority on a line
of cases interpreting Utah Code Ann. §73-110 (1980), which states that water rights
"represented by shares of stock in a corporation .... shall not be deemed to be appurtenant
to the land ...." Those words have been held
to create a mere presumption that irrigation
company stock is not transferred with a conveyance of the land to which the stock has
provided water, and the presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.9 All
of these cases involved a conveyance of full
title rather than creation or priority of a security interest, the issue being whether the irrigation stock was included in a conveyance of
the land on which the water was used.
Applying the case law just described to

CODE*CO
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establish superior priority in the Sevys would
be at variance with the priority structure prescribed by Article 9 of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code. Priority under Utah Code
Ann. §70A-9-312(5) (1980) is determined
generally according to the date on which the
security interest is perfected. For an
"instrument" such as a certificated security,
perfection is accomplished by possession of
the certificate evidencing the security, except
for a 21-day period of automatic perfection
immediately after attachment of the security
interest.9 The Sevys did not take possession of
the irrigation company stock certificate, and
thus did not perfect their security interest in
the irrigation company stock. Therefore,
under Article 9, their priority is inferior to
that of Associates, whose predecessor took
possession of the certificate and transferred
possession of it to Associates.
For Article 9 to apply, the irrigation
company stock must fall within the definition
of an "instrument," which is defined in Utah
Code Ann. §70A-9-105(1)0) as including a
"security." "Security" is in turn defined in
§70A-8-102(l)(a), which provides:
(a) A "security" is an instrument
which (i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and (ii) is of a type
commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets or commonly
recognized in any area in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment; and (iii) is either one of
a class or a series or by its terms is
divisible into a class or series of
instruments; and (iv) evidences a
share, participation or other interest
in property or in an enterprise or
evidences an obligation of the
issuer.
The stock here in question appears to be
issued in registered form as some of a series or
classes of corporate stock, and the stock certificate evidences a share in the irrigation
enterprise of the Long Canal Company. The
Sevys assert, however, that the stock is not "of
a type commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized
in [Utah] as a medium for investment." We
are nevertheless of the opinion that irrigation
company stock is a "medium of investment."
It may be true that there is no established
stock exchange or institutionalized market for
trading in irrigation company stock in Utah.
However, the stock of an irrigation company
ordinarily embodies its capital, provides a
return to its owners in the form of water use,
and was the means by which it amassed the
resources to obtain its water rights and build
its water transport and distribution system. It
is accordingly a medium of investment.
In holding that Article 9 establishes the
superior priority of Associates' security inte-

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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rest, we distinguish the line of cases holding 7. The trust deed of which the Sevys were named
that stock in an irrigation company may be beneficiaries suffices as a security agreement and
appurtenant to, and impliedly conveyed with, both parties appear to have satisfied the prerequisan interest in real property. The rule of those ites of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-203 (1980) for
cases does not apply to the creation and per- creation and attachment of their security interests in
the stock.
fection of security interests in irrigation 8. Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983); Abcompany stock. This conclusion is grounded in bott v. Christcnsen, 660 P.2d 254 (Utah 1983); Hatch
the rule that a later statute supersedes an v. Adams, 7 Utah 2d 73, 318 P.2d 633, aWd
earlier statute if the two are in conflict,10 on reh., 8 Utah 2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) (decided
inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code, on rehearing on the basis of the parol evidence rule)
enacted in 1965 in Utah, followed in time Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 Utah 2d 93,
section 73-1-10 of Utah Code Ann., which 269 P.2d 859 (1954).
was last amended in 1959. Moreover, in view 9. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-304(l), (4) (1980); see also
of the importance of uniformity and predict- R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions 108-110(1973).
ability in commercial law," we favor a result
10. Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385, 387 (Utah
which will not have the effect of creating an 1977); see also Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
exception to the Article 9 priority structure for 757 P.2d 882,884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

something which has the appearance of fitting
rather clearly within that structure. We also
note, as the trial court did, that it is equitable,
as between Sevys and Associates, that the loss
resulting from the double collateralization fall
upon the Sevys, who, albeit unwittingly, left
the Stewarts in the position to again borrow
on the stock.
We therefore hold that the security interest
of Associates in the irrigation company stock
is prior to the unperfected security interest of
the Sevys, and that Associates may foreclose
the Sevys' security interest in accordance with
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code. The order of the district court is therefore affirmed.12
Dean £ . Conder, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Dean £ . Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987).
2. Irrigation companies are a common legal means
of owning and distributing irrigation water in Utah.
Many of them began as cooperative enterprises by
early settlers and eventually took corporate form,
usually on a not-for-profit basis. The ownership
of stock in such a company typically gives the stockholder the right to receive a part of the
company's water proportionate to the 'amount
owned. The ownership of stock in the irrigation
company thus becomes in some respects tantamount
to ownership of the water rights themselves.
3. Associates argues that the notice of appeal is
untimely, based on the fact that the date stamped
on the judgment as the date of entry was altered.
There is no claim, however, of unauthorized tampering with the court records, or even of error in
showing the date of entry as November 4, 1987. We
therefore conclude that the notice of appeal was
timely filed.
4. Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 with Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1988).
5. R. Utah Sup. Ct. 4C; R. Utah Ct. App. 4C.
6. Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634,
635 (1966); Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.,
15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964).

11. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-1-102(1) (1980)
and §70A-l-102(2)(c); Butts v. Glendale
Plywood Co. 710 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1983).
12. Because we hold that Associates' security interest is prior to that of the Sevys, we do not reach
the question of estoppel on which the district court
based its decision, or the question whether the
material facts concerning estoppel were in dispute so
as to preclude summary judgment.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Douglas R. OLSEN,
Petitioner,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, Tyger
Construction, Wausau Insurance Company,
and Second Injury Fund,
Respondents.
No. 880407-CA
FILED: June 23, 1989
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Jay A. Meservy, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
Michael E. Dyer and Brad C. Betebenner, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents Tyger
Construction and Wausau Insurance
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Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent Second Injury Fund
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Billings.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Petitioner Douglas Olsen appeals from the
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